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Abstract	
In	theory,	risk-sharing-based	financing	(RSF)	is	considered	a	corner	stone	of	Islamic	finance.	It	is	argued	to	
render	 Islamic	 banks	 more	 resilient	 to	 shocks.	 In	 practice,	 however,	 this	 feature	 of	 Islamic	 financial	
products	 is	 almost	 negligible.	 Instead,	 debt-based	 instruments,	 with	 conventional	 like	 features,	 have	
overwhelmed	 the	 nascent	 industry.	 In	 addition,	 the	 framework	 of	 present-day	 economic,	 regulatory	 and	
financial	 reality	 inevitably	 exposes	 Islamic	 banks	 in	 dual	 banking	 systems	 to	 problems	 of	 conventional	
banks.	This	includes,	but	is	not	limited	to,	interest	rate	risk.	Empirical	evidence	has,	thus	far,	confirmed	such	
exposures,	despite	Islamic	banks’	 interest-free	operations.	This	study	applies	system	GMM	in	modeling	the	
determinants	 of	 RSF,	 and	 finds	 that	 RSF	 is	 insensitive	 to	 changes	 in	 interest	 rates.	 	 Hence,	 our	 results	
provide	 support	 to	 the	 “stability”	 view	 of	 risk-sharing-based	 financing.	 This	 suggests	 RSF	 as	 the	 way	
forward	 for	 risk	 management	 at	 Islamic	 banks,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 widely	 acceptable	 Shariah	 compliant	
hedging	instruments.	Further	support	to	the	stability	view	is	given	by	evidence	of	counter-cyclicality.	Unlike	
debt-based	 lending	 that	 inflates	 artificial	 asset	 bubbles	 through	 credit	 expansion	 during	 the	 upswing	 of	
business	 cycles,	 RSF	 is	 negatively	 related	 to	 GDP	 growth.	 Our	 results	 also	 imply	 a	 significantly	 strong	
relationship	between	risk-sharing	deposits	and	RSF.	However,	the	pass-through	of	these	deposits	to	RSF	is	
economically	 low.	Only	 about	 40%	of	 risk-sharing	 deposits	 are	 channeled	 to	 risk-sharing	 financing.	 This	
raises	questions	on	the	validity	of	the	industry’s	claim	that	depositors	accustomed	to	conventional	banking	
shun	away	from	risk	sharing	and	signals	potential	for	better	balance	sheet	management	at	Islamic	banks.	
Overall,	 our	 findings	 suggest	 that,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 Islamic	 banks	 can	 gain	 ‘independence’	 from	
conventional	banks	and	interest	rates	through	risk-sharing	products,	the	potential	for	which	is	enormous.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 RSF	 could	 enable	 policy	makers	 to	 improve	 systemic	 stability	 and	 restrain	 excessive	
credit	expansion	through	its	countercyclical	features.		
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1. INTRODUCTION	While	 the	 Islamic	 banking	 industry	 holds	 less	 than	 2%	of	 the	 banking	 assets	worldwide	(NBR)1,	 it	 has	 been	 growing	 at	 a	 compounded	 annual	 growth	 rate	 (CAGR)	 of	 38.5%	between	2004	and	2011	(IFSB,	2013).	From	2009	to	2013	alone,	the	industry	expanded	by	17%	(Ernst	&	Young,	2014-2015).	With	such	remarkable	growth,	this	nascent	industry	has	been	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 Islamic	 finance	 globally.	 In	 2013,	 Islamic	 finance	 assets	 were	estimated	at	US$1.8	trillion.	They	are	expected	to	surpass	the	US$2	trillion	mark	in	2014,	while	 Islamic	 banking	 assets	 are	 expected	 to	 hit	 US$1.6	 trillion	 (KFH	 Research	 Outlook	2014).	Several	arguments	have	been	put	forward	to	explain	this	rapid	growth.	Chong	and	Liu	(2009),	for	example,	attribute	it	to	the	Islamic	resurgence	worldwide	rather	than	to	the	advantages	 of	 the	 risk-sharing	 paradigm	 itself,	 which	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 principal	 mode	 of	Islamic	banking	(The	Kuala	Lumpur	Declaration,	2012).		There	 are	 currently	 over	 300	 institutions	 in	 80	 countries	 carrying	 out	 ‘interest-free’2	banking	 (Ergec	 and	 Arslan,	 2013).	 Only	 Sudan	 and	 Iran	 operate	 full	 Islamic	 financial	systems.	The	rest	of	the	countries	operate	a	dual	banking	system.	There	are	cross-country	variations	 in	 the	 operation	 of	 this	 system,	 too.	 Whereas	 some	 countries	 allow	 Islamic	windows	 of	 conventional	 banks,	 such	 as	 Indonesia,	 Bahrain	 and	 Yemen,	 others	 do	 not.	Turkey	 and	 Kuwait	 serve	 as	 two	 examples	 (Ergec	 and	 Arslan,	 2013).	 In	 most	 of	 the	countries	where	Islamic	banks	operate	parallel	to	conventional	banks,	the	market	share	of	Islamic	banks	is	still	very	low.	Except	in	Kuwait	and	Saudi	Arabia,	where	Islamic	banks	hold	about	 60%	 and	 35%	 respectively,	 Islamic	 banks	 hold	 less	 than	 25%	market	 share	 in	 all	other	countries	(IFSB,	2013).		Based	on	2:275	of	 the	holy	Qur’an	“…but	Allah	has	permitted	trade	and	forbidden	usury”	(Ali	 2006,	 pp.	 100)	 and	 the	 legal	maxims	 “loss	 commensurates	with	 gain”3	 and	 “earning	commensurates	with	liability”4	(Rahman	&	Ismail,	2015,	pp.	177	&	185),	it	has	been	argued	
																																								 																				1	The	National	Bureau	of	Asian	Research.	
2	Islamic	banks	claim	to	be	interest-free.	This	is	so	by	the	fact	that	they	do	not	apply	interest	in	their	financing	
businesses.	However,	various	studies	have	shown	that	Islamic	financial	products	in	general	and	banking	products	
in	particular	are	exposed	to	the	interest	rate	risk,	as	we	will	see	later	in	our	literature	review	section.	
3	“Al-ghurmu	bi	al-ghunmi.”	
4	“Al-kharaju	bi	al-dhaman.”	
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that	the	organizing	principle	of	Islamic	finance	rests	on	two	conditions:	risk-sharing	and	no	
riba.	 The	 first	 constitutes	 the	 necessary	 and	 second	 sufficient	 conditions	 that	 render	 a	financial	system	Islamic	(Mirakhor,	2010;	The	Kuala	Lumpur	Declaration,	2012;	Askari	et	al.,	2012;	 Iqbal	and	Mirakhor,	2013,	Alaabed	et.	al.,	2015).	Together,	 these	conditions	are	theorized	 to	 bring	 the	 added	 advantages	 of	 financial	 inclusion,	 financial	 stability	 and	shared	prosperity	(World	Bank,	2015).		It	may	be	worth	digressing	at	this	point	to	dispel	any	confusion	between	risk	sharing	and	profit-and-loss	 sharing	 (PLS).	 PLS	 and	 risk	 sharing	 are	 not	 two	 different	 techniques	 of	financing.	 Without	 risk	 sharing,	 there	 can	 be	 no	 PLS.	 Parties	 to	 a	 PLS	 contract	 (say	 a	
Mudharabah	 contract)	 have	 to	 decide	 on	 a	 share	 parameter	 at	 the	 outset,	 before	 any	production	 or	 sale	 of	 product	 takes	 place.	 The	 future	 is	 unknown	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	negotiations	 for	 the	 share	 parameter.	 The	 decision	 is,	 therefore,	 subject	 to	 risk	 and	uncertainty.	Hence,	 ex-ante,	 the	partners	decide	on	a	 share	parameter	 according	 to	 their	ability	 to	 put	 at	 risk	 their	 financial	 or	 other	 resources.	 So,	 the	 ex-post	 profit	 and	 loss	sharing	is	ex-ante	risk	sharing.	Mudharabah	and	Musharakah	are,	therefore,	two	examples	of	 Shari’ah	 compliant	 partnership	 contracts,	 which	 are	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 risk	sharing.		Contrary	to	this	view,	Shaikh	(2010)	argues	that	as	per	the	current	orthodox	understanding	and	 practice	 of	 Islamic	 finance,	 the	 often-cited	 preferable	 modes	 of	 financing	 like	
Mudharabah	and	Musharakah	are	incapable,	even	in	a	simple	model	economy	with	them	as	the	 only	 mode	 of	 financing.	 This	 is	 so,	 he	 argues,	 because	 Islamic	 values	 like	 justice,	equality,	 truth,	 trust,	 kindness,	 honesty	 and	 responsibility	 are	 lacking	 in	 practice.	Hence,	these	 instruments	 remain	 rarely	 used.	 Abdul-Rahman	 et.	 al.	 (2014)	 argue	 that	 PLS	 is	difficult	to	grow	when	Islamic	banks	operate	as	financial	intermediaries.	Their	argument	is	based	 on	 principles	 of	 the	 New	 Institutional	 Economic	 Theory.	 They	 suggest	 that	 PLS	contracts	would	best	be	positioned	if	Islamic	banks	play	the	role	of	genuine	entrepreneurs	instead	of	intermediaries	as	currently	practiced.			Indeed,	 due	 to	 supervisory	 and	 competitive	 pressures	 in	 the	 market	 place,	 the	 current	practices	of	Islamic	banks	have	significantly	diverged	from	the	theoretical	models	initially	
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envisaged	 (Rosly,	 1999;	 Mirakhor,	 2010;	 Archer	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Farook	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 The	present	 formation	 of	 Islamic	 banking	 has	 grown	 out	 of	 conventional	 banking	 and	 uses	many	of	its	techniques	and	instruments	(Alaabed	et.	al.,	2015).	Only	a	negligible	portion	of	Islamic	banks’	financing	is	strictly	based	on	risk	sharing	(Chong	and	Liu,	2009)	and	to-date	it	 comprises	 less	 than	 3%	 of	 total	 financing	 in	 Malaysia	 (Abdul-Rahman	 et	 al.,	 2014).	Instead,	 financing	 of	 Islamic	 banks	 in	 Malaysia,	 for	 example,	 is	 dominated	 by	 debt-like	financing	instruments	based	on	deferred	payment	sales	(Murabahah	and	BBA)	and	leasing	(Ijarah).	Together,	they	constitute	about	80	percent	of	the	total	financing	of	Islamic	banks	in	Malaysia	(Kader	&	Leong,	2009).	Overall,	Chong	and	Liu	(2009)	see	Islamic	banking	 in	Malaysia	not	very	different	from	conventional	banking.			The	current	practices	of	Islamic	banks	were	justified	at	the	initial	stages	on	the	basis	that	customers	were	accustomed	to	conventional	banking	and	its	fixed-cost	instruments	(Bacha,	2004,	2008).	They	were	deemed	necessary	for	the	industry	to	gain	commercial	significance	and	market	share.	The	trajectory,	however,	has	not	been	free	of	cost.	Islamic	banks	in	dual	banking	systems	have,	as	a	result,	been	exposed	to	problems	of	conventional	banks.	This	includes,	 but	 is	 not	 limited	 to,	 interest	 rate	 risk	 (Ibrahim	 and	 Sufian,	 2014).	 Indeed,	 if	Islamic	 banks	 continue	 issuing	 more	 debt-like	 instruments,	 which	 are	 interest	 rate	benchmarked	and	are	substantially	 indifferent	 from	conventional	 loans	-	except	 in	 forms,	they	run	the	risk	of	undermining	their	stability	potential	and	amplifying	their	interest	rate	exposure	(Haneef	and	Mirakhor,	2014;	Bacha,	2004,	2008).			One	 way	 to	 evade	 such	 outcomes	 is	 to	 offer	 products	 that	 are	 essentially	 completely	different	 from	 their	 conventional	 counterparts.	 Risk-sharing-based	 investment	 accounts	(RSIA)	on	the	liability	side	of	Islamic	banks	may	well	fit	this	criterion.	The	accounts	operate	on	a	Mudharabah	basis.	On	the	asset	side,	Mudharabah	and	Musharakah	could	be	used	as	the	underlying	contract	in	a	variety	of	financing	products.	These	will	be	used	to	finance	real	sector	activities.	The	rate	of	return	will	be	determined	ex-post,	depending	on	the	outcome	of	 financed	 activities.	 	 In	 addition,	 risk	 sharing	 can	 serve	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 other	 financial	instruments	offered	by	the	government,	monetary	authority	and	banking	institutions.	With	
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growing	operations	and	 recognition	beyond	Muslim-dominated	markets,	 is	 it	not	 time	 to	“unlock	the	full	potential	of	Islamic	finance”	(Lagarde,	2015)?	As	proposed	means	of	unlocking	this	potential,	it	is	important	to	gain	better	understanding	of	 risk-sharing	based	 instruments	 and	 substantiate	 their	 characteristics	 empirically.	 This	paper	constitutes	a	humble	attempt	towards	this	understanding.	Our	main	objective	 is	 to	determine	whether	the	risk-sharing-based	financing	of	Islamic	banks	is	immune	to	interest	rate	risk.	Also,	we	want	to	see	how	other	bank-specific	and	country-specific	 factors	affect	these	unique	products.	Lastly,	we	want	to	see	how	much	of	risk-sharing-based	investment	accounts	are	channeled	into	RSF.	A	 number	 of	 empirical	 studies	 have	 investigated	 the	 potential	 determinants	 of	 Islamic	banks’	assets	or	financings.	Their	methodology,	however,	calls	 for	reconsideration.	Assets	or	 financings	 are	 often	 put	 together	 and	 treated	 as	 one	 even	 though	 they	 may	 be	completely	 different,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Islamic	 banking.	 It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	we	want	to	make	a	humble	attempt	to	take	risk-sharing-based	financings	out	and	study	them	separately	 in	 order	 to	 find	 their	 determinants.	 And	 also	 compare	 them	 vis-à-vis	 the	determinants	of	other	Islamic	financings/assets	in	total,	which	are	dominated	by	debt-like	instruments,	as	well	as	conventional	loans.		The	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	The	second	section	provides	literature	review.	The	third	section	will	describe	the	data	and	methodology.	In	the	fourth	section,	we	shall	analyze	and	discuss	 the	 empirical	 results.	 Finally,	 the	 fifth	 section	 concludes	 with	 suggested	implications	and	recommendations	for	the	industry’s	practitioners	and	policy	makers.	
2. LITERATURE	REVIEW	Comparative	 literature	 is	admittedly	scarce,	as	 risk-sharing-based	 financings	are	peculiar	to	Islamic	banking.	The	short	history	of	the	Shari’ah	compliant	industry	also	contributes	to	the	scarcity.	The	literature	on	the	determinants	of	conventional	lending,	however,	is	more	widely	 available	 and	 could	perhaps	be	used	as	 a	point	of	 reference.	 The	determinants	of	conventional	 bank	 lending	 are	 divided,	 in	 general,	 into	 two	main	 categories.	 The	 first	 is	
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microeconomic	in	nature.	The	second	is	macroeconomic.	Microeconomic	factors	are	those	factors	which	are	bank-specific,	such	as	deposits,	bank	size,	bank	capitalization,	collateral	security,	 capital	 ratios,	 non-performing	 loans,	 type	 of	 ownership	 and	 liquidity,	 among	others.	Macroeconomic	variables,	on	 the	other	hand,	 include	GDP,	 interest	 rate,	 inflation,	stock	prices,	exchange	rates,	industrial	indices	and	others.		In	 analyzing	 bank-specific	 determinants	 of	 conventional	 bank	 lending,	 Chernykh	 &	Theodossiou	 (2011)	 found	 that	 bank	 size,	 capitalization	 and	 provision	 for	 losses	 have	positive	 impact	 over	 long-term	 business	 loans	 in	 Russia.	 Ownership	 type,	 on	 the	 other	hand,	was	 found	 to	 be	 insignificant.	 Constant	 and	Ngomsi	 (2012)	 further	 reaffirmed	 the	positive	affect	of	bank	size	and	capitalization	in	a	cross-country	study	of	six	Central	African	Economic	 and	 Monetary	 Community	 (CEMAC)	 members.	 Moreover,	 they	 documented	 a	similar	 positive	 effect	 of	 long-term	 liabilities.	 Non-performing	 loans	 were	 found	 to	 be	statistically	 insignificant.	On	the	contrary,	Karim	et	al.	 (2014)	studied	52	Islamic	and	186	conventional	banks	 in	14	OIC	countries	and	 found	 that	bank	size	has	negative	 impact	on	both	 conventional	 banks’	 lending	 and	 Islamic	 banks’	 financing,	 while	 Abdul	 Karim	 et.	 al	(2011)	found	that	bank	size	has	no	impact	on	Malaysian	commercial	banks’	loan	supply.	In	line	 with	 financial	 intermediation	 theory,	 Hossain	 et.	 al.	 (2013)	 found	 that	 deposits	positively	affect	loans	in	a	case	study	of	RAKUB	bank	in	Bangladesh.		In	 the	 context	 of	 Islamic	 banks	 and	 bank-specific	 determinants,	 Kader	 &	 Leong	 (2009)	tested	 conventional	 lending	 rate	 and	base	 lending	 rate	 as	 determinants	 of	BBA	property	financing	in	Malaysia	and	found	that	they	are	both	significantly	positive.	Rama	and	Kassim	(2013)	report	contrary	findings	in	the	case	of	Murabahah	 financing	of	 Indonesian	Islamic	banks.	 The	 authors	 found	 that	 Islamic	 financing	 rate,	 Islamic	 and	 conventional	 deposit	rates	 and	 conventional	 lending	 rate	 are	 not	 significant	 determinants	 of	 Murabahah	financing	in	the	short-term.		Turning	 to	macroeconomic	 determinants	 of	 bank	 lending	 or	 financing,	 interest	 rate	was	found	 to	 inversely	 impact	conventional	banks’	 lending	 in	 Japan	(Kim	and	Moreno,	1994),	Malaysia	(Kader	&	Leong,	2009;	Abdul	Karim	et.	al,	2011)	and	Turkey	(Ergec	and	Arslan,	2013).	However,	 in	his	study	of	Malaysian	banks,	 Ibrahim	(2006)	 found	 the	 impact	 to	be	
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positive.	 The	 empirical	 findings	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 interest	 rate	 on	 Islamic	financings	are	mixed,	too.	Kader	&	Leong	(2009)	and	Ergec	and	Arslan	(2013)	document	a	positive	effect.	Contrary	 to	 that,	Adebola	et.	al.	 (2011),	 Ibrahim	and	Sukmana	(2011)	and	Ibrahim	and	Sufian	(2014)	in	their	studies	on	Malaysia	found	a	negative	effect.	Output,	 as	 a	macroeconomic	 variable	 that	 captures	 economic	 cycle,	was	 found	 to	 have	 a	positive	impact	on	lending	in	Malaysia	(Ibrahim,	2006).	The	impact	was	further	confirmed	by	Pruteanu-Podpiera	(2007)	for	Czech	Republic,	by	Du	(2011)	for	China,	by	Constant	and	Ngomsi	(2012)	for	CEMAC,	and	by	Karim	et.	al.	(2014)	for	OIC	countries.	However,	Kim	and	Moreno	 (1994)	 found	 the	 impact	 to	 be	 negative	 for	 Japanese	 banks.	 In	 the	 context	 of	Islamic	 banks,	 the	 findings	 are	 also	 mixed.	 While	 Ibrahim	 and	 Sukmana	 (2011)	 and	Adebola	 et.	 al.	 (2011)	 determined	 that	 there	 is	 no	 significant	 impact	 at	 all,	more	 recent	studies	done	by	Karim	et.	al.	(2014)	and	Ibrahim	and	Sufian	(2014)	found	output	to	solicit	positive	responses	from	Islamic	financing.		The	effects	of	 inflation	on	conventional	bank	 lending	and	 Islamic	bank	 financing	are	also	very	mixed	across	the	literature.	It	was	found	to	be	negative	for	conventional	banks	(Kim	and	Moreno,	1994;	Karim	et.	al.,	2014),	but	positive	for	Islamic	banks	(Karim	et.	al.,	2014;	Ibrahim	 and	 Sufian,	 2014).	 Furthermore,	 Du	 (2011)	 found	 it	 to	 have	 positive	 effects	 on	conventional	banks	if	it	is	less	than	3.9%	and	negative	if	it	is	more	than	3.9%.	On	the	other	hand,	inflation	was	found	to	be	insignificant	in	the	case	of	conventional	banks	by	Ibrahim	(2006),	Pruteanu-Podpiera	(2007),	Constant	and	Ngomsi	(2012)	and	in	the	case	of	Islamic	banks	by	Rama	and	Kassim	(2013).		Other	 variables	 such	 as	 stock	 prices	 have	 been	 found	 to	 be	 significantly	 positive	 in	determining	 conventional	 bank	 lending	 (Kim	 and	 Moreno,	 1994;	 Ibrahim,	 2006;	 and	Adebola	et.	al.,	2011),	but	exchange	rate	and	producer	price	indices	have	been	found	to	be	mainly	 insignificant.	 See	 for	 example	 Ibrahim	 (2006),	 Ibrahim	 and	 Sukmana	 (2011),	Adebola	et.	al.	(2011),	Rama	and	Kassim	(2013).	
RISK-SHARING	FINANCING	OF	ISLAMIC	BANKS:	BETTER	SHIELDED	AGAINST	INTEREST	RATE	RISK?	
	
	 8	
3. MODEL,	DATA	AND	METHODOLOGY		
3.1. 	Model		To	investigate	the	determinants	of	risk-sharing	financing	of	Islamic	banks,	with	particular	focus	on	the	effect	of	interest	rate,	we	propose	the	following	empirical	model	based	on	the	relevant	literature:	
RSFi,	t	=	β0	+	β₁RSFi,	t-1	+	β₂RSDi,	t	+	β₃BSi,	t	+	β₄INTRi,	t	+	β₅GDPGRi,	t	+	β₆INFLi,	t	+	εi,	t	Where:	‘i’	indicates	the	bank	(i	=	1,.	.	.,132),		‘t’	indicates	the	annual	time	period	(t	=	2008,.	.	.,2013)	RSF	 –	 Risk-sharing	 financing	 (Mudharabah,	 Musharakah	 and	 Musharakah	 Mutanaqisah	financings	of	real	activities,	not	financial	instruments)	in	US$	RSD	–	risk-sharing	deposits	or	investment	accounts	(Mudharabah	deposits)	in	US$	BS	–	Size	of	the	bank	defined	as	the	natural	logarithm	of	total	assets	GDPGR	–	GDP	growth	rate	INTR	–	Real	interest	rate	INFL	–	Inflation	The	effects	of	the	selected	variables	on	conventional	banks’	lending	and/or	Islamic	banks’	financing	are	summarized	in	Table	1.						
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Table	1.	Effects	of	selected	variables	on	conventional	banks’	lending	(C)	and	Islamic	banks’	
financing	(I)	
	Note:		*					GDP	**			GDP	growth	***	Industrial	production		The	 signs	 in	 the	 table	 indicate	 the	 impact	 of	 selected	 variables	 on	 lending	 or	 financing,	 where	 ‘-‘	 implies	negative,	‘+’	implies	positive,	and	‘x’	implies	no	significant	impact.	
3.2. Data		The	data	used	in	our	study	is	annual	data	for	2008-2013.	It	covers	132	full-fledged	Islamic	banks	 from	 28	 different	 countries	 (The	 list	 of	 studied	 banks	 and	 countries	 is	 given	 in	Appendix).	 The	 data	 for	 bank	 specific	 variables	 was	 obtained	 from	 Islamic	 Banking	Intelligence	database,5	while	the	data	for	macroeconomic	variables	was	obtained	from	the	World	 Bank.6	 Risk-sharing	 financing	 and	 risk-sharing	 deposits	 data	will	 be	 used	 in	 their	absolute	values	 form	(US$),	while	 the	size	 is	 computed	by	using	 the	natural	 logarithm	of	total	assets.	The	macroeconomic	variables	are	all	in	percentage	points.	Table	2	provides	the	summary	of	descriptive	statistics	for	the	selected	variables.	Table	3	provides	the	matrix	of	correlation	coefficients	that	indicates	a	mixed	correlation	among	the	variables.		
	
	
	
																																								 																				
5	www.islamicbankingintelligence.com	
6	www.data.worldbank.org	
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Table	2:	Summary	of	descriptive	statistics		
Variable		 Observation	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	 Min	 Max	
RSF	 428	 1.03E+09	 2.49E+09	 1620	 1.58E+10	
RSD	 499	 3.29E+09	 5.65E+09	 52254.77	 3.61E+10	
BS	 686	 20.86308	 2.296893	 13.17178	 24.99047	
INTR	 641	 2.140296	 8.844543	 -19.9269	 47.05332	
GDPGR	 790	 3.262196	 4.286876	 -15.08839	 17.66303	
INFL	 791	 10.22298	 10.14223	 -4.863278	 39.26636	Note:	RSF	–	Risk-sharing	financing;	RSD	–	Risk-sharing	deposits;	BS	–	bank	size;	INTR	–	Interest	rate;	GDPGR	–	GDP	growth	rate;	INFL	–	Inflation		
Table	3:	Correlations	
		 RSF	 RSD	 BS	 INTR	 GDPGR	 INFL	
RSF	 1	 		 		 		 		 		
RSD	 0.827	 1	 		 		 		 		
BS	 0.5651	 0.7089	 1	 		 		 		
INTR	 -0.28	 -0.2095	 -0.1831	 1	 		 		
GDPGR	 -0.2268	 -0.1353	 -0.0972	 0.2075	 1	 		
INFL	 0.4778	 0.3046	 0.2468	 -0.4648	 -0.6452	 1	Note:	RSF	–	Risk-sharing	financing;	RSD	–	Risk-sharing	deposits;	BS	–	bank	size;	INTR	–	Interest	rate;	GDPGR	–	GDP	growth	rate;	INFL	–	Inflation		
3.3. Methodology	For	 our	 set	 of	 data,	 which	 is	 panel	 data	 with	 very	 low	 number	 of	 T’s	 and	 quite	 a	 high	number	of	N’s,	 the	most	appropriate	model	to	use	is	dynamic	panel	data.	 	Dynamic	panel	data	 regressions	 are	 characterized	 by	 two	 sources	 of	 persistence	 over	 time,	 namely,	autocorrelation	due	to	the	presence	of	a	lagged	dependent	variable	among	the	regressors	and	 individual	 effects	 characterizing	 the	 heterogeneity	 among	 the	 individuals.	 The	endogeneity	problem	associated	with	dynamic	models	is	dealt	with	in	this	paper	using	the	generalized	method	of	moments	(GMM)	procedure	proposed	by	Arellano	and	Bond	(1991)	which	is	more	efficient	than	the	instrumental	variable	(IV)	estimation	procedure	suggested	by	 Anderson	 and	 Hsiao	 (1981).	 Arellano	 and	 Bond	 (1991)	 demonstrate	 additional	instruments	can	be	obtained	in	a	dynamic	panel	data	model	if	one	utilizes	the	orthogonality	
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conditions	 that	 exist	 between	 lagged	 values	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 and	 the	disturbances.	Using	 these	moment	 conditions,	Arellano	 and	Bond	 (1991)	propose	 a	 two-step	difference	GMM	estimator.	Blundell	and	Bond	(1998)	demonstrate	however	 that	 the	instruments	 used	 in	 the	 difference	 GMM	 estimator	 become	 less	 informative	 in	 two	important	 cases.	 Firstly,	 as	 the	 autoregressive	 parameter	 increases	 towards	 unity;	 and	second	 as	 the	 variance	 of	 the	 parameter	 effect	 increases	 relative	 to	 the	 variance	 of	 the	transitory	shocks.	Arellano	and	Bover	(1995)	and	Blundell	and	Bond	(1998)	propose	that	an	additional	mild	 stationarity	 restriction	on	 the	 initial	 conditions	process	allows	 for	 the	use	 of	 an	 extended	 system	 GMM	 estimator.	 The	 system	 GMM	 estimation	 is	 found	 to	 be	more	appropriate	in	the	presence	of	variables	that	are	close	to	a	random	walk	(Bond,	2002;	Roodman,	2009).	The	difference	GMM	estimation	under	these	conditions	is	found	to	suffer	from	a	weak	instrument	problem	(Sarafidis	et	al.,	2009).	The	difference	GMM	approach	also	magnifies	gaps	 in	unbalanced	panels	(Roodman,	2009),	which	 is	 the	case	 in	our	panel.	 In	view	of	 the	above,	we	run	both	 the	 two-step	difference	and	system	GMM	estimations	 for	our	 panel	 data	 set	 (see	 the	 tables	 in	 Appendix).	 We	 follow	 up	 with	 post	 estimation	specification	 tests,	 namely	 the	 Sargan	 (1976)	 and	 Hansen	 tests	 for	 over-identifying	restrictions	 and	 the	 Arellano	 and	 Bond	 (1991)	 test	 for	 no	 autocorrelation	 in	 the	 first-differenced	errors.		Having	 pointed	 out	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 each	 model	 and	 having	 run	 both	models,	we	 choose	 system	GMM	as	more	 appropriate	 for	our	 type	of	data	 and	variables.	This	is	because	the	estimated	coefficient	of	the	lagged	dependent	variable	for	the	two-step	system	 estimator	 increases	 significantly	 on	 average	 relative	 to	 the	 two-step	 differenced	estimator	 (it	 increases	 from	0.04	 to	0.29),	which	 is	a	 lot	more	 than	 the	required	50%	by	Windmeijer	 (2005)	 in	order	 to	correct	 the	downward	bias	of	 standard	errors7.	However,	we	 should	 bear	 in	mind	 that	 high	 persistence	 in	 the	 series	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	expectations	of	asymptotic	efficiency	gains	using	system	GMM	(Blundell	and	Bond,	1998;	Roodman,	2009).		
																																								 																				
7	The	autoregressive	parameter	is	still	lower	than	the	standard	rule	of	thumb	of	0.8		(Roodman,	2009).	
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We	apply	the	Windmeijer	(2005)	finite-sample	correction	to	the	reported	standard	errors	in	 the	 two-step	 estimation,	without	which	 estimations	 of	 the	 standard	 errors	 tend	 to	 be	severely	downward	biased.	Specifying	Windmeijer	corrected	(WC-robust)	standard	errors	also	 produces	 variance–covariance	 estimates	 that	 are	 robust	 to	 heteroskedasticity.	With	regards	 to	 the	 instrument	 proliferation	 problem,	we	 do	 not	 follow	 the	 Roodman	 (2009)	rule	of	thumb	that	suggests	collapsing	the	instrument	matrix.	It	is	however	relevant	to	note	given	 the	 time	 series	 dimension	 in	 this	 study,	 the	 number	 of	 instruments	 does	 not	outnumber	 the	 individual	 units	 (number	 of	 groups).	 This	 suggests	 potential	 problems	of	instrument	proliferation	are	not	existent.	 Issues	associated	with	 instrument	proliferation	are	particularly	suspected	in	system	GMM	estimations	as	a	large	instrument	collection	over	fits	 endogenous	 variables	 even	 as	 it	 weakens	 the	 Hansen	 test8	 of	 the	 instruments’	 joint	validity	(Roodman,	2009).		
4. EMPIRICAL	FINDINGS	We	 begin	 our	 analysis	 by	 determining	 the	 variables	 that	 are	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 the	variation	 in	 RSF	 for	 our	 sample.	 The	 basic	 results	 from	 the	 two-step	 system	 GMM	WC	robust	regression	are	reported	in	Table	4.	Other	reports	are	available	in	Appendix.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																								 																				
8	Hansen	test	is	used	here	instead	of	Sargan	given	the	use	of	Windmeijer	(2005)	finite-sample	correction	
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Table	4:	Two-step	system	GMM	WC-Robust9	
RSF	 Coef.	
WC-Robust	
Std.	Err.	 Z	 P>z	 [95%	Conf.	Interval]	
RSF	L1.	 0.2956922	 0.0287696	 10.28	 0.000	 0.2393049	 0.3520796	
RSD	 0.397399	 0.0230105	 17.27	 0.000	 0.3522993	 0.4424987	
BS	 6.40E+08	 2.05E+08	 3.12	 0.002	 2.37E+08	 1.04E+09	
GDPGR	 -7.92E+07	 2.08E+07	 -3.81	 0.000	 -1.20E+08	 -3.84E+07	
INTR	 -4649784	 6263446	 -0.74	 0.458	 -1.69E+07	 7626345	
INFL	 -5.48E+07	 1.13E+07	 -4.86	 0.000	 -7.69E+07	 -3.27E+07	
_cons	 -1.29E+10	 4.54E+09	 -2.85	 0.004	 -2.18E+10	 -4.04E+09	
No.	of	observations	 192	 Wald	chi2(6)	 	3187.22	 		
	
		
No.	of	groups	 58	 Prob	>	chi2	 0.0000	
	 	 	No.	of	instruments	 20	
	 	 	 	 	AR(1)	Prob	>	z	 0.5298	
	 	 	 	 	AR(2)	Prob	>	z	 0.9572	 		 		 		 		 		
Instruments	for	differenced	equation	
								GMM-type:	L(2/.).rsf	
								Standard:	D.rsd	D.bs	D.gdpgr	D.intr	D.infl	
Instruments	for	level	equation	
								GMM-type:	LD.rsf	
						Standard:	_cons	
	
		 		 		 		 		Note:	RSF	–	Risk-sharing	financing;	RSD	–	Risk-sharing	deposits;	BS	–	bank	size;	INTR	–	Interest	rate;	GDPGR	–	GDP	growth	rate;	INFL	–	Inflation		As	 per	 expectations,	 the	 significance	 of	 RSD	 implies	 that	 it	 explains	 variation	 in	 RSF.	However,	the	size	of	the	estimated	coefficient	is	well	below	unity.	The	pass-through	or	the	amount	 of	 each	 RSD	 unit	 that	 is	 channeled	 towards	 RSF	 appears	 to	 be	 quite	 low.	 On	average,	only	about	0.4	or	40%	of	each	dollar	deposited	into	RSD	goes	into	RSF.	This	ratio	is	considered	very	low	if	we	take	into	account	that	risk-sharing	financings	generally	offer	higher	 potential	 returns.	 Also,	 Islamic	 capital	 and	 money	 markets	 in	 general	 are	 still	relatively	undeveloped.	Capital	and	money	market	 instruments	based	on	risk	sharing	are	even	more	so.	For	that	reason,	we	would	expect	RSD	to	be	channeled	towards	risk-sharing	financing	 of	 real	 activities,	 as	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 most	 feasible	 solution.	 Aside	 from	signaling	mismatches	in	the	risk-return	profiles	of	bank’s	assets	and	liabilities,	this	finding	questions	 practitioners’	 claims	 regarding	 depositors’	 demand	 for	 and	 acceptance	 of	 risk	
																																								 																				
9	The	command	used	for	this	two-step	system	GMM	estimation	is	xtdpdsys	with	vce(robust)	for	Windmeijer	(2005)	
WC-robust	estimator	
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sharing.	 Customers	 are	 placing	 more	 deposits	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 risk	 sharing	 than	 Islamic	banks	 have	 extended	 in	 financing.	 The	 finding	 is	 broadly	 in	 line	 with	 the	 evidence	 of	religiosity	and	loyalty	of	Islamic	banks	depositors	found	by	Zaheer	and	Farooq	(2015).		The	authors	found	that	Islamic	bank	depositors	were	less	likely	to	withdraw	funds	as	compared	to	 conventional	 depositors	 during	 the	 recent	 global	 financial	 crisis	 in	 Pakistan.	 On	 the	contrary,	 some	 even	 placed	 deposits	 during	 the	 crisis	 period.	 Similar	 attitudes	 were	demonstrated	 in	 a	 recent	 survey	 in	Pakistan10.	 55	per	 cent	of	 respondents	 (Islamic	bank	depositors)	said	they	would	not	withdraw	funds	in	case	of	bank	loss.	Malaysian	depositors	had	voiced	the	same	stance	before	(Gerrard	and	Cunningham,	1997).	In	fairness,	however,	financings	depend	on	investment	opportunities	(Ibrahim,	2016)	and	demand	for	financing	too,	which	is	beyond	the	scope	of	our	study.	Thus,	we	cannot	claim	that	there	is	enough	investment	opportunities	and	demand	to	absorb	all	the	RSD	or	more	than	the	current	40%.		But,	as	we	pointed	out	earlier,	our	findings	question	practitioners’	claims	that	depositors	are	not	keen	on	risk	sharing.	 	Hence,	the	low	pass-through	ratio	of	RSD	could	be	in	part	caused	by	the	state	of	Islamic	capital	markets.	Islamic	capital	markets	in	 general	 are	 under-developed,	 even	 more	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 risk-sharing-based	instruments.	 Furthermore,	 regulatory	 restrictions	 and	 burdens	 on	RSF	may	 be	 playing	 a	role	as	well.	In	calculation	of	capital	adequacy	requirements,	the	RSF	is	considered	as	very	risky	 and	 as	 such	 the	 risk	 weight	 assigned	 can	 go	 up	 to	 400%.	 Last	 but	 not	 least,	 risk-sharing	 financing	 requires	 entrepreneurial	 skills.	 	 Islamic	 banks	 still	 do	 not	 have	 such,	arguably.		Bank	size	is	found	to	positively	impact	risk-sharing	financing.	In	other	words,	bigger	banks	practice	more	RSF	than	small	banks.	This	relationship	can	be	explained	intuitively.	Bigger	banks	are	better	capitalized	and	can	benefit	from	both	scale	economies	and	diversification.	Therefore,	 they	 may	 afford	 more	 risk-sharing	 assets	 in	 their	 portfolio	 and	 may	 also	 be	better	equipped	for	such	endeavors.	This	result	is	in	line	with	the	findings	of	Chernykh	and	Theodossiou	(2011)	and	Constant	and	Ngomsi	(2012)	for	conventional	banks.		
																																								 																				
10	From	Farooq	and	Zaheer	(2015)	-	DFID-SBP:	Knowledge,	Attitudes,	and	Practices	of	Islamic	Banking	in	Pakistan,	
2014.	Available	online	at	http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/KAPStudy.pdf,	(accessed	07-Oct-2014)	
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More	 importantly,	our	 test	 shows	 that	 there	 is	no	 relationship	between	RSF	and	 interest	rate	even	at	the	10%	significance	level.	This	is	in	contrast	to	all	the	papers	reviewed,	which	infer	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 loans/financings	 and	 interest	 rates.	 The	relationship	is	mainly	negative	in	the	case	of	conventional	bank	lending	(Kim	and	Moreno,	1994;	Kader	&	Leong,	2009;	Abdul	Karim	et.	al.,	2011;	Ergec	and	Arslan,	2013)	and	mixed	when	it	comes	to	aggregate	Islamic	bank	financing	(Positive:	Kader	&	Leong,	2009;	Ergec	and	Arslan,	2013;	Negative:	Adebola	et.	al.,	2011;	Ibrahim	and	Sukmana,	2011;	Ibrahim	and	Sufian,	2014).	However,	it	is	important	to	note	that	most	of	the	studies	conducted	thus	far	have	used	aggregate	financings,	assuming	them	all	as	one	(Kader	&	Leong,	2009;	Ergec	and	Arslan,	2013;	Adebola	et.al.,	2011;	Ibrahim	and	Sukmana,	2011;	Ibrahim	and	Sufian,	2011).	This	 runs	 the	 risk	 of	 missing	 important	 information	 regarding	 the	 heterogeneity	 of	different	financing	products.	Islamic	banking	currently	is	predominantly	involved	in	debt-like	financing,	whereby	the	profit	rates	are	benchmarked	to	the	interest	rates.	Risk-sharing	financing,	on	the	other	hand,	are	equity-like11,	but	which	have	not	been	studied	separately	so	 far,	 to	 the	 best	 of	 our	 knowledge.	 Therefore,	 the	 result	 is	 not	 surprising	 at	 all	 after	recognizing	 and	 segregating	 the	 difference	 of	 both	 financings.	 Our	 results	 support	 the	stabilizing	 view	 of	 risk-sharing-based	 financing.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 widely-acceptable	Shari’ah	 compliant	 hedging	 instruments,	 the	 finding	 suggests	 that	 Islamic	 bank	 may	mitigate	the	prevalent	interest	rate	risk	in	the	dual	banking	environments	by	issuing	risk-sharing-based	financing	(Bacha,	2004,	2008).	Another	interesting	and	unexpected	result	is	the	one	on	real	output	growth.	It	implies	very	significant	negative	correlation	between	real	output	growth	and	risk-sharing	financing.	In	other	words,	risk-sharing	financing	is	countercyclical.	It	increases	when	economic	activities	slow	down,	and	vice	versa.	Indeed,	a	close	tie	to	real	economy	is	expected	given	the	asset-linked	 nature	 of	 risk-sharing	 financings.	 However,	 the	 evidence	 contradicts	 the	 common	cyclicality	of	bank	 lending	or	 financing	behavior.	The	majority	of	 the	 literature	 reviewed	suggest	positive	relationship	between	real	output	and	loans	or	 financings	(Ibrahim	2006;	Pruteanu-Podpiera	2007;	Du	2011;	Constant	and	Ngomsi	2012;	Karim	et.al.	2014,	Ibrahim	and	 Sufian	 2014).	 However,	 as	 pointed	 out	 earlier,	 all	 of	 these	 studies	 used	 aggregate	
																																								 																				
11	The	returns	are	determined	ex-post.	
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financings,	 in	which	risk-sharing	financing	with	its	completely	different	features	accounts	only	 for	 a	 small	 portion.	 Aggregating	 may	 have	 concealed	 important	 cross-sectional	differences.	 Anyway,	 it	 is	 this	 pro-cyclicality	 that	 attributes	 destabilization	 to	 banking	credit	(Minsky,	1984).	Hence,	our	evidence	of	counter-cyclicality	provides	further	support	to	 the	 stabilizing	merit	 of	 risk-sharing-based	 financing.	 It	 also	 lends	 credence	 to	 similar	findings	by	Ibrahim	(2016).	The	author	finds	the	financing	decisions	of	Malaysian	Islamic	banks	in	general	and	the	full-fledged	Islamic	banks	in	particular	to	be	counter-cyclical.			Inflation,	 too,	 is	 found	 to	 have	 a	 significant	 negative	 relationship	 with	 risk-sharing	financing.	 Inflation	 causes	 distortion	 and	 uncertainty	 in	 economy.	 From	 the	 demand	 for	funds	point	of	view	(businesses	and	entrepreneurs),	inflation	reduces	consumer	confidence	and	spending.	 It	 also	makes	 consumers	uncertain	of	what	 the	 future	will	be	 like,	 so	 they	hold	on	to	their	cash	for	possible	rainy	days.	As	a	consequence,	aggregate	demand	reduces.	Inflation	 also	 increases	 costs	 and	 lowers	 competitiveness,	 which	 also	 can	 lead	 to	 falling	demand.	All	of	this	undermines	business	confidence	and	postpones	capital	investment,	and	thus	dampens	the	demand	for	risk-sharing	financing.	Similarly,	on	the	supply	side	of	funds,	investment	 account	 holders	 would	 not	 want	 their	 funds	 to	 get	 exposed	 to	 unnecessary	adverse	price	movements,	 and	 therefore	would	 reduce	 their	 supply	of	 investment	 funds.	Banks	being	cautious	as	they	are,	and	having	a	reduced	supply	of	funds,	wouldn’t	want	to	take	 this	 risky	 endeavor	 either.	 Having	 said	 that,	 this	 negative	 impact	 of	 inflation	 on	financing	 in	general	and	risk-sharing	 financing	 in	particular,	 for	 it	 is	mainly	 long-term,	 is	very	much	 expected.	 Our	 result	 confirms	 the	 previous	 studies	 done	 by	Kim	 and	Moreno	(1994)	and	Karim	et.al.	(2014),	who	also	found	that	the	relationship	between	conventional	loans	and	inflation	is	negative.		
5. CONCLUSION	This	study	uses	previously	established	theories	and	models	to	investigate	the	interrelations	between	 risk-sharing	 financing	 and	 other	 bank-specific	 and	 country-specific	 variables	 in	the	context	of	Islamic	banks.	Risk	sharing	is	considered	a	unique	feature	of	Islamic	banking	and	is	the	objective	of	Islamic	finance	(Mirakhor,	2009;	Kuala	Lumpur	Declaration,	2012).	
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By	 its	 nature,	 this	 type	 of	 financing	 should	 not	 have	 anything	 to	 do	 with	 interest.	 In	conformity	 with	 this	 hypothesis,	 risk-sharing	 financing	 of	 Islamic	 banks	 seems	 to	 be	immune	to	interest	rate	risk.	If	Islamic	banking	wants	to	ever	gain	its	‘independence’	from	conventional	banking,	then	this	is	the	right	way.		The	study	has	also	found	that	risk-sharing	financing	has	the	added	advantage	of	stabilizing	credit	 expansion	 during	 the	 upswing	 of	 business	 cycles,	 which	 would	 otherwise	 inflate	artificial	 asset	 bubbles	 that	 eventually	 burst	 triggering	 crises	 and	 economic	 recessions.	Similarly,	we	 found	 that	 bank	 size	matters	 in	 risk-sharing	 financing	 and	 that	 inflation	 is	detrimental	to	the	same.		We	also	found	potential	for	better	balance	sheet	management	in	Islamic	banks.	There	exists	a	strong	relationship	between	RSF	and	RSD,	but	the	 latter	 is	channeled	 inadequately	 into	RSF.	 Some	 of	 the	 possible	 reasons	 are:	 (i)	 debt-geared	 regulatory	 framework,	 which	constrains	RSF	through	imposition	of	high-risk	weight	in	capital	adequacy	computation,	(ii)	the	intermediary	nature	of	Islamic	banks,	which	is	not	conducive	for	RSF.	Interestingly,	this	finding	 questions	 practitioners’	 worn-out	 claims	 that	 depositors	 are	 not	 keen	 on	 risk	sharing.		Overall,	the	findings	of	this	study	contradict	earlier	findings	(Adebola	et.al.,	2011,	Kader	&	Leong,	2009,	Chong	and	Liu	2009)	that	Islamic	banks	financing	is	complementary,	and	not	a	 substitute	 to	 conventional	 banks’	 lending.	 Risk-sharing	 financing	 of	 Islamic	 banks	 has	proven	to	be	unique	and	immune	to	interest	rate.	Hence,	 for	the	development	of	resilient	Islamic	banking	and	Islamic	finance,	it	is	recommended	that	Islamic	banks	should	engage	in	more	 risk-sharing	 financing.	 Regulators	 may	 also	 wish	 to	 revise	 the	 high-risk	 weight	assigned	for	risk-sharing	financing	in	light	of	these	findings.	Else	it	will	be	burdensome	for	Islamic	 banks	 and	will	 impede	 their	 aspirations	 to	 operationalize	 the	 essence	 of	 Islamic	finance.					
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8. APPENDIX	
	
Table	1A:	Arellano-Bond	dynamic	panel-data	estimation,	two-step	WC-robust	(difference	GMM)	
RSF	
WC-Robust	
Coef.	 Std.	Err.	 z	 P>z	 [95%	Conf.	 Interval]	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
RSF	L1.	 0.0403512	 0.0542956	 0.74	 0.457	
-
0.0660662	 0.1467687	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	RSD	 2.56E-01	 3.86E-02	 6.65	 0.000	 1.81E-01	 3.32E-01	
BS	 1.58E+08	 1.53E+08	 1.03	 0.302	 -1.42E+08	 4.57E+08	
GDPGR	 -7.34E+07	 1.99E+07	 -3.69	 0.000	 -1.12E+08	 -3.44E+07	
INTR	 -3.60E+07	 9.54E+06	 -3.77	 0.000	 -5.47E+07	 -1.73E+07	
INFL	 -3.00E+07	 1.51E+07	 -1.99	 0.046	 -5.96E+07	 -4.80E+05	
_cons	 -2.36E+09	 3.12E+09	 -0.76	 0.449	 -8.47E+09	 3.75E+09	
No.	of	observations	 133	
	 	 	 	 	No.	of	groups	 46	
	 	 	 	 	No.	of	instruments	 16	
	 	 	 	 	AR(1)	Prob	>	z	 0.243	
	 	 	 	 	AR(2)	Prob	>	z	 0.056	
	 	 	 	 	Sargan	Prob	>	chi2	 NA	 	 	 	 	 	
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Table	2A:	List	of	studied	banks:	
	
No. Country+Bank No. Country+Bank
1 Albania	United	Bank	of	Albania 67 Jordan	Jordan	Islamic	Bank
2 Bahrain	ABC	Islamic	Bank 68 Kazakhstan	Al	Hilal	Bank
3 Bahrain	Al	Baraka	Islamic	Bank 69 Kenya	Gulf	African	Bank	Limited
4 Bahrain	Al	Salam	Bank	Bahrain 70 Kuwait	Ahli	United	Bank
5 Bahrain	Bahrain	Islamic	Bank 71 Kuwait	Boubyan	Bank
6 Bahrain	Capinnova	Investment	Bank 72 Kuwait	Kuwait	Finance	House
7 Bahrain	Elaf	Bank 73 Lebanon	Blom	Development	Bank	SAL
8 Bahrain	Family	Bank 74 Malaysia	Affin	Islamic	Bank
9 Bahrain	First	Energy	Bank 75 Malaysia	Al	Rajhi	Bank
10 Bahrain	Gulf	Finance	House 76 Malaysia	Alliance	Islamic	Bank
11 Bahrain	Ibdar	Bank	B.S.C.	(c) 77 Malaysia	AmIslamic	Bank
12 Bahrain	International	Investment	Bank 78 Malaysia	Asian	Finance	Bank
13 Bahrain	Investors	Bank 79 Malaysia	Bank	Islam	Malaysia
14 Bahrain	Ithmaar	Bank 80 Malaysia	Bank	Muamalat	Malaysia
15 Bahrain	Khaleeji	Commercial	Bank 81 Malaysia	Bank	Rakyat
16 Bahrain	Kuwait	Finance	House 82 Malaysia	CIMB	Islamic	Bank
17 Bangladesh	Al-Arafah	Islami	Bank 83 Malaysia	Hong	Leong	Islamic	Bank
18 Bangladesh	EXIM	Bank 84 Malaysia	HSBC	Amanah	Malaysia
19 Bangladesh	First	Security	Islami	Bank 85 Malaysia	Kuwait	Finance	House	(Malaysia)
20 Bangladesh	ICB	Islamic	Bank 86 Malaysia	Maybank	Islamic
21 Bangladesh	Islami	Bank	Bangladesh 87 Malaysia	OCBC	Al-Amin
22 Bangladesh	Shahjalal	Islami	Bank 88 Malaysia	Public	Islamic	Bank
23 Bangladesh	Social	Islami	Bank 89 Malaysia	RHB	Islamic	Bank
24 Bangladesh	Union	Bank	Limited 90 Malaysia	Standard	Chartered	Saadiq
25 Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	Bosna	Bank	International 91 Maldives	Maldives	Islamic	Bank
26 Brunei	Darussalam	Bank	Islam	Brunei	Darussalam 92 Oman	Bank	Nizwa	SAOG
27 Egypt	Al	Baraka	Bank	Egypt 93 Pakistan	Al	Baraka	Bank
28 Egypt	Faisal	Islamic	Bank	of	Egypt 94 Pakistan	BankIslami
29 Indonesia	Panin	Bank	Syariah 95 Pakistan	Burj	Bank
30 Indonesia	PT	Bank	BRI	Syariah 96 Pakistan	Dubai	Islamic	Bank	Pakistan
31 Indonesia	PT	Bank	Jabar	Banten	Syariah 97 Pakistan	Meezan	Bank
32 Indonesia	PT	Bank	Maybank	Syariah	Indonesia 98 Philippines	Amanah	Islamic	Bank
33 Indonesia	PT	Bank	Muamalat	Indonesia 99 Qatar	Barwa	Bank
34 Indonesia	PT	Bank	Syariah	Bukopin 100 Qatar	Masraf	al	Rayan
35 Indonesia	PT	Bank	Syariah	Mandiri 101 Qatar	Qatar	International	Islamic	Bank
36 Indonesia	PT	Bank	Syariah	Mega	Indonesia 102 Qatar	Qatar	Islamic	Bank
37 Indonesia	PT	BNI	Syariah 103 Saudi	Arabia	Bank	Albilad
38 Iran	Ansar	Bank 104 South	Africa	Albaraka	Bank
39 Iran	Bank	Day 105 Sudan	Al	Jazeera	Sudanese	Jordanian	Bank
40 Iran	Bank	Hekmat	Iranian 106 Sudan	Al-Shamal	Islamic	Bank
41 Iran	Bank	Keshavarzi	(Agriculture	Bank) 107 Sudan	Albaraka	Bank	Sudan
42 Iran	Bank	Khavarmianeh	(Middle	East	Bank) 108 Sudan	AlSalam	Bank	Sudan
43 Iran	Bank	Maskan 109 Sudan	Bank	of	Khartoum
44 Iran	Bank	Melli	Iran 110 Sudan	Blue	Nile	Mashreg	Bank
45 Iran	Bank	of	Industry	and	Mine 111 Sudan	Byblos	Bank	of	Africa
46 Iran	Bank	Pasargad 112 Sudan	Faisal	Islamic	Bank
47 Iran	Bank	Sepah 113 Sudan	Farmer's	Commercial	Bank
48 Iran	Bank	Shahr 114 Sudan	Savings	and	Social	Development	Bank
49 Iran	EN	Bank 115 Sudan	Sudanese	Egyptian	Bank
50 Iran	Export	Development	Bank	of	Iran 116 Sudan	Sudanese	French	Bank
51 Iran	Ghavamin	Bank 117 Sudan	United	Capital	Bank
52 Iran	Iran	Zamin	Bank 118 Syria	Syria	International	Islamic	Bank
53 Iran	Karafarin	Bank	(PJSC) 119 Turkey	Albaraka	Turk
54 Iran	Mellat	Bank 120 Turkey	Bank	Asya
55 Iran	Parsian	Bank 121 Turkey	Kuveyt	Turk
56 Iran	Post	Bank 122 Turkey	Turkiye	Finans	Katilim	Bankasi
57 Iran	Refah	K.	Bank 123 United	Arab	Emirates	Abu	Dhabi	Islamic	Bank
58 Iran	Saderat	Bank 124 United	Arab	Emirates	Ajman	Bank
59 Iran	Saman	Bank 125 United	Arab	Emirates	Dubai	Islamic	Bank
60 Iran	Sarmayeh	Bank 126 United	Arab	Emirates	Emirates	Islamic	Bank
61 Iran	Sina	Bank 127 United	Arab	Emirates	Noor	Islamic	Bank
62 Iran	Tejarat	Bank 128 United	Kingdom	Bank	of	London	and	The	Middle	East
63 Iran	Tose'e	Ta'avon	Bank 129 United	Kingdom	European	Islamic	Investment	Bank
64 Iraq	Cihan	Bank 130 United	Kingdom	Islamic	Bank	of	Britain
65 Iraq	Elaf	Islamic	Bank 131 Yemen	Shamil	Bank	of	Yemen	&	Bahrain
66 Jordan	Islamic	International	Arab	Bank 132 Yemen	Tadhamon	International	Islamic	Bank
